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Law Explorers

Legal research, legal writing, and legal translation are the lights that illuminate the dark, unknown regions in the universe of law.


Can we translate our customary methods and techniques when research transports us into another legal culture?

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Cultures and legal systems other than our own have made valuable contributions to the history of written law.

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Translation provides a laboratory in which we can learn to elevate our capacity to select and use legal terminology.

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Can we reconcile globalization[1] with the diversity[2] of the legal systems of our world?[3]  Globalization[4] and localization[5] have added urgency to the task of cross-cultural communication in law.[6]

As we move from one nation or legal system to another, we cannot evade the remarkable divergence in the dimensions and details of law:

  • the sources[7] and divisions of law;[8]
  • the subdivisions[9] of laws[10] or statutes;[11]
  • the terminology and the concepts;[12]
  • the roles of judges,[13] lawyers,[14] and scholars;[15]
  • the names of courts[16] and the importance of custom[17] and judicial precedents;[18]
  • the nature of legal education[19] and legal research;[20]
  • the effects of colonialism[21] and conquest;[22] and
  • the capacity for abstraction.[23]

Comparative law[24] has no settled criteria[25] by which to categorize legal systems into families or traditions.  And any such scheme of categories is incomplete[26] and impermanent; legal families and systems change[27] over time,[28] and new legal traditions and systems emerge.[29]

We promote communication when we illuminate the obscure and foreign aspects of languages, terminology, and legal systems.  If we educate ourselves and one another about the similarities and differences, we can minimize mistakes and misunderstandings and maximize comprehension and cooperation.[30]

Unfamiliar legal systems and traditions[31] and their influences[32] can put our understanding to the test.[33]  But if we use our imagination,[34] we can learn much[35] from legal systems that are different from our own.[36]

Our legal universe is diverse.  We can ignore it . . . or we can explore it! 

[1] The United Nations Multilingual Terminology Database (UNTERM) has defined “globalization” as the “[e]xpansion of global linkages, organization of social life on global scale and growth of global consciousness, hence consolidation of world society. UNTERM, s.v. globalization, accessed May 19, 2013,

[2] “Every comparatist learns that the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems, but often solves these problems by quite different means.”  J. Paul Lomio and Henrik Spang-Hanssen, Legal Research Methods in the U.S. and Europe, 2nd ed. (Copenhagen: DJØF, 2009), 287.

[3] “Much universalised thinking about globalisation goes too far in its uncritical acceptance of the advantages of uniformisation.  It is rather unreal to expect that the whole world would ever follow one rule system, one language and culture, or one law. . . . While global uniformity is an idealistic vision, it would not only be boring, taking away all the colourful differences of human existence, but also intrinsically repressive.”  Werner Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3-4.

[4] “A central feature of the new, global economy which has emerged in the context of intensified relations is that it is informational.  That is to say, the productivity and competitiveness of firms in the new economic order depend on their ability to create, process and apply knowledge-based information efficiently.”  Michael Cronin, “Globalization,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies, eds. Mona Baker and Gabriela Saldanha, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2011), 126.

[5] “The emergence and exponential growth of the localization industry in the late twentieth century was the most obvious consequence of the need to satisfy the translation needs generated by the informational economy in the era of global markets. . . . An important impetus for the growth in web localization is the increasing numbers of web users who are non-English speaking and who prefer web content in their own language. . . . If information is acknowledged to be the basic raw material of the new global economy and significant economic gains are to be made from the production of goods with a high cognitive content, then not only is language a key factor in the expression of that information but language also represents a crucial means of accessing the information.”  Cronin, “Globalization,” 126-27 (emphasis omitted).

[6] “[L]egal discourse — which used to be employed in narrow professional and local milieus and thus more closely geared to specific cultural values and identity systems — is now more and more frequently involved in globalization processes, which have relevant consequences on the discourse produced by both native and non-native practitioners working in intercultural and cross-cultural settings.”  Maurizio Gotti, “Globalizing Trends in Legal Discourse,” in Translation Issues in Language and Law, eds. Frances Olsen, Alexander Lorz, and Dieter Stein (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 56.

[7] Law “comes from a variety of sources.”  Steven M. Barkan, “An Introduction to Legal Research,” in Roy M. Mersky and Donald J. Dunn, Fundamentals of Legal Research, 8th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2002), 1.  And “[t]he sources can vary from country to country.”  Marci Hoffman and Mary Rumsey, International and Foreign Legal Research: A Coursebook (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 135.

The expression “source of law” possesses more than one sense:

The expression “source of law” has three principal meanings, which may be distinguished as literary, historical, and legal sources of law.

The literary sources of law . . . are those sources which serve as the recognized and authentic literary repository of the various rules and directions of a particular legal system for purpose of ascertaining their content.

The historical sources are those sources which constitute the historical-factual origin of particular legal norms. . . .

The legal sources . . . are the sources of law and means of creating law recognized by a legal system itself as conferring binding force on the norms of that system. 

Menachem Elon, “Introduction,” in The Principles of Jewish Law (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 10 (reference omitted).

[8] “It is obvious enough that the law can be divided in various ways to serve a variety of functions.  It is equally obvious, although more difficult to demonstrate, that any division of the law is bound to shape the legal system.  The conventional way of dividing the law becomes a part of the law itself, affecting the way that law is formulated and applied.”  John Henry Merryman and Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin America, 3rd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 91.

[9] In the context of legal drafting, the English noun “section” refers to “either a subdivision of a document or a subdivision of an article in a document, statutory title, or code.”  Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), s.v. “section.”  But some legal systems use the term differently.  The appropriate French equivalent for the English term in the laws of Québec, for example, would probably be the French term “article” instead of “section.”  Jean-Claude Gémar and Vo Ho-Thuy, Difficultés du langage du droit au Canada, 2nd ed. (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 1997), s.v. “section.”

[10] Philosopher H.L.A. Hart considered the question “What is law?” and concluded “that nothing concise enough to be recognized as a definition could provide a satisfactory answer to it.”  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 16.  One of the senses of “law” is simply “[a] statute.”  Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (St. Paul: West, 2009), s.v. “law.”

[11] “[I]n [American English],” the legal term “statute” “refers to a legislative act that the state gives the force of law,” but “[i]n [British English], . . . ‘statute’ bears a broader meaning.”  Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage, s.v. “statute” (italics replaced by single quotation marks).

[12] Professor Susan Šarčević noted that “the legal terminology of different legal systems is, for the most part, conceptually incongruent” and “that the boundaries between the meanings of concepts of different legal systems are incongruent.”  Susan Šarčević, New Approach to Legal Translation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 232.

[13] An example is the “substantially more modest role” of judges in the Civil Law tradition as opposed to the role of judges in the Common Law tradition, although “the traditional image of the civil law judge is waning” and "[t]he trend is toward increased judicial scope and power.”  Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition, 3rd ed., 37-38.

[14] Author Debra Evenson compared the obligations of Cuban lawyers to the obligations of lawyers in the United States:

The law [of Cuba] guarantees every lawyer the right to practice with independence and with all the legal rights and guarantees to initiate proceedings and make statements related to the rights he or she defends.  The law also obliges lawyers to observe and contribute to the strengthening of socialist legality.  In a sense, this obligation is not very different from the obligations imposed on lawyers in the United States, who as officers of the court, are expected to scrupulously obey the law.  It differs, however, in that Cuban lawyers are expected to support socialist ideology and to work for the perfection of socialist law, whereas U.S. lawyers have no obligation to support any particular ideology or legal philosophy.

Debra Evenson, Law and Society in Contemporary Cuba, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 78 (references omitted).

[15] Legal scholars have been called “the dominant actors of the civil law [tradition],” where “[l]egislators, executives, administrators, judges, and lawyers all come under the scholars’ influence.”  Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition, 3rd ed., 60.

[16] The names of courts sometimes vary within the same country.  The Supreme Court of the United States is the highest court in the federal judicial system of the U.S., for example, but the Supreme Courts of New York are trial courts in the court system of the State of New York.  Dana Neacşu, Introduction to U.S. Law and Legal Research (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, [2005]), 49, 52-53.

[17] Custom can be a source of domestic law in the form of “practices or beliefs, such as tribal law, folk law, or indigenous law,” but customary law is difficult to locate because it “is usually not written down.”  Hoffman and Rumsey, International and Foreign Legal Research, 12.  In public international law, “[the] sources include state or diplomatic papers, municipal legislation dealing with international matters, and legislative acts of intergovernmental organizations.”  Hoffman and Rumsey, International and Foreign Legal Research, 12.

[18] “[T]he familiar common law doctrine of stare decisis — i.e., the power and obligation of courts to base decisions on prior decisions — is obviously inconsistent with the separation of powers as formulated in civil law countries, and is therefore rejected by the civil law tradition.  Judicial decisions are not law.”  Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition, 3rd ed., 23.

[19] According to sociologist Max Weber, “[w]herever legal education has been in the hands of practitioners, especially attorneys, who have made admission to practice a guild monopoly, an economic factor, namely, their pecuniary interest, brings to bear a strong influence upon the process not only of stabilizing the official law and of adapting it to changing needs in an exclusively empirical way but also of preventing its rationalization through legislation or legal science.”  Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society, ed. Max Rheinstein, trans. Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein, 20th Century Legal Philosophy Series 6 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 202-03.  Weber gave the example of England, where “[t]he English lawyers . . . were largely successful in preventing both a systematic and rational type of lawmaking and a rational legal education, such as exists in the Continental universities.”  Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society, 203 (reference omitted).

[20] “[R]esearch approaches in Civil Law vary by country and by topic, and no single procedure will work for all purposes.”  Lomio and Spang-Hanssen, Legal Research Methods in the U.S. and Europe, 132.

[21] The terms “reception,” “borrowing,” “transplantation,” and “imposition” have been used to refer to the movement of a legal tradition from one part of our world to another.  Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008), 73.  The explanations for the movement of law include colonialism and westernization:

Beyond the zone of European culture, the conceptual systems of legal orders largely correspond either to common law or to civil law.  This is explained partly through the colonial era, partly through the general westernization of other continents.

Heikki E.S. Mattila, Comparative Legal Linguistics, trans. Christopher Goddard (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 106.  One notable example of the impact of colonialism was the importation of the Common Law tradition to North America:

When the English colonized North America, eventually overcoming competition from the French and other nations, foremost among the many practices and institutions that they imported was the common law. . . . The content and method of the common law were absorbed into American social culture and have never been displaced.

Graham Hughes, “Common Law Systems: The Reception of the Common Law in America,” in New York University School of Law, Fundamentals of American Law, ed. Alan B. Morrison (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 12.

“Before the arrival of European nations and the formation of the United States,” however, “the laws of Indian nations usually took the form of informal, common-law rules,” and “Indian political communities governed themselves in accordance with their internal customs and traditions, a tribal customary law closely linked to their language, religious beliefs, and the land they occupied.”  Matthew L.M. Fletcher, “Native American Law,” in The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History, Volume 4: Land–Provincial Edicts and Government, ed. Stanley N. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 207.  The importation of the English Common Law to the United States subordinated those preexisting legal systems:

Native American law as legal history encompasses at least two major categories — federal Indian law and the laws of American Indian nations.  Federal Indian law is the law that describes and controls the relationships between American Indian tribes, the United States, and the several states. . . . The laws of American Indian tribes, in contrast, involve the internal legal relationships of Indian political communities.

Fletcher, “Native American Law,” 206-7.

[22] Professor Wael B. Hallaq described how the territorial expansion of Islam contributed to the development of the Islamic legal tradition:

It was in the Hejazi cities of Mecca and Yathrib — later renamed Medina — that a man called [Muhammad] came forward to proclaim a new religion with a political order at its center.  By the time of his death in 11/632, he had left behind a small state and clear notions of justice, but with underdeveloped ideas of law and an even less developed judiciary.  Soon, however, Islam was to conquer lands east and west, ranging from western China to the Iberian peninsula.  Along with this territorial expansion, the new religion generated a full-fledged, sophisticated law and legal system in the short span of the three-and-a-half centuries that followed its inception.

. . . Prior to the Arab expansion in the name of Islam, Arabian society had developed the same types of institutions and forms of culture that were established in the imperial societies to the south and north, a development that would later facilitate the Arab conquest of this region. . . . It was these societies and cultures that provided the larger context in which Islam, as a legal phenomenon, was to grow.

Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, Themes in Islamic Law 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 8.

The date that appears in that description (11/632) serves as an example of translation between two different calendars.  The conventional translation of “the first year in the Islamic calendar” is 622 CE.  John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), s.v. “Hijrah.”  Hallaq explained the difficulty that the difference between two calendars presents for the writer and for the reader:

This book uses a dual system of dating: one is the Muslim Hijri calendar, the other Gregorian (e.g., 166/782).  To omit the former would deprive the reader of the sense of relativity of time in Muslim history; and to omit the latter would probably aggravate the problem even further (and in other ways to boot).  I have therefore thought it judicious to use both calendars.  But this method has its own problems, hence the following caveat: In this work, it is often stated that this or that event occurred, for example, “at the end of the second/eighth century.”  In fact, the end of that Hijri century, say 190-200, corresponds to 805-815 AD, i.e., the beginning of the ninth century AD.  Stylistically, it would be awkward consistently to render the Gregorian equivalent of the approximate Hijri date numerically.  So the reader is advised that in such contexts, the Gregorian dates in this book are provided merely as guidelines, whereas the Hijri calendar reflects the more accurate dating.  However, the reader will do well to keep in mind that the ends of the first three Hijri centuries roughly correspond to an average of a decade and a half in the beginning of each of the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries AD.

Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 6-7.

[23] The capacity for abstraction is one of the characteristics that have contributed to the historical differences between legal systems or traditions:

While the conceptual division of abstract and concrete law transformed English law from an administrative into a “legal” practice, the lack of an abstract concept of rights and the transmutable boundaries of original legal meanings determined the administrative features of Islamic and Chinese law.

Sharron Gu, The Boundaries of Meaning and the Formation of Law: Legal Concepts and Reasoning in the English, Arabic, and Chinese Traditions (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 4.

[24] “’[C]omparative law’ is the comparison of the different legal systems of the world.”  Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, trans. Tony Weir, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 2.

[25] Comparatists Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz commented on efforts to divide legal systems into families :

We are told that, as with languages in comparative linguistics, legal systems are to be put into families on the basis of similarities and relationship, but it is never made really clear which common qualities are the crucial ones.

Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 65.  They proceeded to identity an error in previous efforts and to offer the “concept of style” as a basis for division:

The unsatisfactory feature of most previous attempts to distinguish the legal families and to attribute individual systems to them is that they are one-dimensional, that is, they seek to make everything turn on a single criterion.

In our view, the critical thing about legal systems is their style, for the styles of individual legal systems and groups of legal systems are each quite distinctive.  The comparatist must strive to grasp these legal styles, and to use distinctive stylistic traits as a basis for putting legal systems into groups.

The concept of style which originated in the literary and fine arts has long been used in other fields.  Style in the arts signifies the distinctive element of a work or its unity of form, but many other disciplines use this fertile concept to indicate a congeries of particular features which the most diverse objects of study may possess.

Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 67-68 (italics omitted).

[26] Professor Patrick Glenn commented on the possibility that there are unidentified legal traditions:

In looking at (only) seven legal traditions of the world, it has been impossible to avoid the existence of other recognizable legal traditions.  Some might say the other legal traditions are minor ones, which complement or oppose the traditions which have been examined.  This may or may not be accurate, since there are no well-established criteria for distinguishing major from minor traditions, in law or in any other field of endeavour.  If the traditions which have been examined here . . . appear presently as the major ones of the world, it may be that this is only a conclusion of first impression, and that there are other legal traditions — of thought, of expression, or of sources — which are still more profound and which await investigation, and recognition, as being of primary importance.

H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law, 3rd ed.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 344.

[27] For example, Socialist Law was once included among our world’s “three highly influential legal traditions.”  John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, [1985]), 1.  Circumstances changed, however:

[D]uring the height of Soviet state socialism there was an organized effort to construct an independent and valid socialist legal tradition.  However, most of the socialist law nations had previously been participants in the civil law tradition, to which they reverted when the socialist law superstructure collapsed.

Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition, 3rd ed., 2.

[28] The measurement of time is commonly based on a calendar:

A calendar is a method of combining days into periods, such as weeks, months, and years, for the convenience of civil life, the guidance of day-by-day activities, and the fixing of religious feasts and observances.

Attempts to construct a satisfactory calendar go back to the dawn of civilization.

Sir Harold Spencer Jones, “The Calendar,” in A History of Technology: Volume III; from the Renaissance to the Industrial Revolution c. 1500–c. 1750, eds. Charles Singer, E.J. Holmyard, A.R. Hall, and Trevor I. Williams, with the assistance of Y. Peel and J.R. Petty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958) 558.

Examples of calendars include the Gregorian calendar, the Hindu calendar, the Islamic calendar, the Jewish calendar, the Julian calendar, and the lunar calendar.  Mike Darton and John Clark, The Macmillan Dictionary of Measurement (New York: Macmillan, 1994), s.v.v. “era, calendrical,” “Gregorian calendar,” “year.”  The calendrical era, or historical period, of each calendar begins with an emergent year from which dates are calculated, but not all calendars begin with the same emergent year.  Darton and Clark, The Macmillan Dictionary of Measurement, s.v.v. “emergent year,” “era, calendrical,” “Gregorian calendar,” “year.”  The abbreviations “CE” and “BCE” are sometimes used in place of, respectively, the abbreviations “AD” (anno Domini) and “BC” (before Christ).  Cynthia Barnhart et al., eds., The Oxford Essential Dictionary of Abbreviations (New York: Berkley Books, 2004), s.v.v. “AD,” “BC”; Darton and Clark, The Macmillan Dictionary of Measurement, s.v. “era, calendrical.”  Where it is necessary or desirable, Law Explorers® will use the abbreviations “CE” (Common Era) and “BCE” (before the Common Era) to indicate the calendrical era except in some quotations.

[29] For example, Zweigert and Kötz noted the possibility that “an African legal family” would someday be recognized:

It is possible for a quite new legal family to emerge as time goes by, and we may at the moment be approaching the time when the systems of sub-Saharan Africa should be classed together as an African legal family.  These African legal systems have long been an object of fascination to comparative lawyers, legal ethnologists, and legal sociologists, despite the appalling difficulties of doing research on them.

Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 66 (emphasis and reference omitted).

Based on the impact of law that was “received” through colonialism, author Charles Mwalimu has identified the “Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone and Mixed Jurisdictions” as the “[f]our main subdivisions of legal traditions [that] are generally found in Africa.”  Charles Mwalimu, Seeking Viable Grassroots Representation Mechanisms in African Constitutions: Integration of Indigenous and Modern Systems of Government in Sub-Saharan Africa (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 74.   The suffix “-phone” is of Greek origin and indicates speakers of a particular language.  Shorter Oxford English Dictionary: On Historical Principles, 6th ed., s.v. “-phone.”

[30] The motivations for the division of legal systems into families include the benefits of understanding and cooperation:

The legal systems of the world can be divided into major legal families, in line with certain criteria, notably conceptual relationship.  The main justification for this division lies in the fact that a knowledge of the similarities and differences between legal concepts of various countries helps avoid misunderstandings in international cooperation.  Such knowledge will enable a lawyer or legal translator to detect cases of mistake or misunderstanding.  This, in turn, will lead to checking the matter in a trustworthy source.

Heikki E.S. Mattila, Comparative Legal Linguistics, trans. Christopher Goddard (Farnham: Ashgate, 2006), 106 (reference omitted).

[31] “To lawyers outside Anglo-Saxon lands the traditional Common Law is well nigh incomprehensible,” for example, “[b]ut Englishmen fully share this incomprehension mixed with aversion, as far as ‘the alien jungle of the Code Civil’ is concerned.”  R.C. van Caenegem, The Birth of the English Common Law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 85 (references omitted).

[32] Comparative law can reveal the impact that moral and political values and other influences have had on a legal system:

Comparative law can help to illuminate the nature of legal phenomena and the relationship between law and political, moral, and other values.  It can also help demonstrate the extent to which the form and substance of any legal system are not “natural,” but result from the implementation of moral and political values.

Lomio and Spang-Hanssen, Legal Research Methods in the U.S. and Europe, 278 (references omitted).

[33] The figurative expression “put someone or something to the test” means “to see what someone or something can achieve.”  Richard A. Spears, comp., McGraw-Hill’s Dictionary of American Idioms and Phrasal Verbs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), s.v. “put someone or something to the test.”

[34] “The comparatist who wants to find in a foreign system the rules which are functionally equivalent to those which interest him in his native law requires both imagination and discipline.”  Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 36-37.

[35] “Anyone, lawyer or nonlawyer, who wants to understand Europe and Latin America (or, for that matter, the civil law nations of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa),” for instance, “should become familiar with the civil law tradition.”  Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition, 3rd ed., 151.

[36] According to Professor Werner Menski, “the task of the comparatist in cherishing difference involves open-minded appreciation of ‘the other’, readiness to accept the other system as valid in it is own right, thinking in open rather than closed basic categories.”  Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context, 32.


Title of page Legal Systems
Address of page
Geographic areas Quebec; Cuba; United States of America; England; North America; Mecca; Yathrib; Medina; China; Iberian Peninsula; Soviet Union; Africa; Europe; Latin America; Middle East; Asia
Languages English; French; Greek
Terms and phrases legal system; globalization; localization; comparative law; legal tradition; custom; Common Law; Civil Law; calendar; legal terminology; legal concept; imagination; colonialism; legal education; reception; borrowing; transplantation; imposition
Events European colonialism; spread of Islam
Publications Legal Research Methods in the U.S. and Europe; Fundamentals of Legal Research; International and Foreign Legal Research; New Approach to Legal Translation; The Civil Law Tradition (3rd ed.); The Civil Law Tradition (2nd ed.)
Authors Werner Menski; Jean-Claude Gemar; Vo Ho-Thuy; Bryan Garner; H.L.A. Hart; Debra Evenson; Max Weber; Rose-Marie Belle Antoine; Wael Hallaq; Sharron Gu; Konrad Zweigert; Hein Kotz; Patrick Glenn; Charles Mwalimu; Heikki Mattila
Websites, blogs, and other online resources UNTERM
Organizations United Nations; Supreme Court of the United States